Social media and self-control: The vices and virtues of attention by Bermúdez, Juan Pablo
This	is	a	preprint	draft	of	a	paper	that	will	appear	in:		
C.	G.	Prado	(ed.)	2017.	Social	Media	and	Your	Brain.	Praeger.		
Please	cite	the	print	version.	
 
SOCIAL	MEDIA	AND	SELF-CONTROL:	
THE	VICES	AND	VIRTUES	OF	ATTENTION	
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The	Web	2.0	and	the	perils	of	distraction	
Picture	a	child	sitting	in	front	of	a	long,	empty	table.	An	adult	in	front	of	her—the	only	other	
person	in	the	room—puts	a	marshmallow	on	the	table,	right	in	front	of	the	child,	and	tells	her	
she	has	two	options:	she	could	eat	one	marshmallow	right	now,	or	she	could	wait	until	the	
experimenter	came	back,	and	then	she	would	get	two	marshmallows.	
This	is	the	setting	of	what	has	become	one	of	the	most	famous	psychological	
experiments.	The	children	in	the	test	are	of	preschool	age	(around	4.5	years	old	on	average).	In	
getting	them	to	pick	between	a	smaller,	sooner	reward	and	a	larger,	later	reward,	researchers	
sought	to	assess	their	capacity	for	self-control,	i.e.	for	postponing	gratification	and	persisting	in	
the	search	for	a	greater,	more	distant	goal.	The	children	had	to	wait	typically	fifteen	minutes,	in	
a	lonely	room	designed	to	have	no	distracting	elements,	while	avoiding	a	temptation	that	was,	
quite	literally,	in	front	of	their	faces.	
While	interesting	on	its	own,	the	study	became	famous	when	researchers	followed	up	
on	the	original	participants	and	assessed	how	they	were	doing	during	their	adolescence	and	
adulthood.	They	found	that	those	who	had	managed	to	delay	gratification	as	children	were	
later	more	likely	to	have	higher	academic	scores,	more	stable	emotional	lives,	richer	
relationships,	and	lower	Body	Mass	Indexes.1	
So	it	seems	that	the	‘marshmallow	experiment’—as	it	is	usually	called—managed	to	
measure	a	very	crucial,	multipurpose	capacity	that	contributes	greatly	to	the	overall	shape	our	
																																																						
1	Some	of	the	initial	findings	can	be	found	in	Mischel	and	Ebbesen	(1970)	and	Mischel	et	al.	(1972).	(The	
experiment’s	setting	is	somewhat	simplified	here	for	presentation	purposes.)	Follow-up	studies	are	reported	in	
Shoda	et	al.	(1990)	and	Schlam	et	al.	(2013),	among	others.	See	also	de	Ridder	et	al.	(2012).	
lives	take.	Researchers	found	that	the	self-control	capacities	at	stake	here	were	correlated	to	
children’s	ability	to	control	their	attention:	those	who	were	most	successful	in	waiting	for	the	
bigger	reward	managed	to	keep	their	mind	focused	on	things	other	than	the	marshmallow;	to	
do	this	they	used	mental	tricks,	like	transporting	themselves	to	other	places	with	their	
imagination,	or	bodily	tricks,	like	closing	their	eyes.	Thus	there	is	reason	to	think	that	our	
capacity	for	controlling	our	attention	and	our	capacity	to	exert	self-control	are	very	closely	
linked.	
By	‘self-control’	I	refer	to	the	capacity	to	select	which	among	our	desires	and	intentions	
become	effective	in	our	behaviour,	and	follow	through	with	that	selection	despite	distractions	
and	temptations.	This	amounts	to	the	capacity	to	control	our	selves,	i.e.	to	give	shape	and	
contour	to	our	identities	as	agents	through	time.	In	this	sense,	self-control	is	very	closely	linked	
to	notions	like	autonomy	and	freedom	of	the	will.	The	ultimate	philosophical	teaching	of	the	
marshmallow	experiment	may	therefore	be	that	self-control,	this	capacity	to	shape	our	selves,	
is	heavily	dependent	on	the	capacity	to	control	the	direction	of	our	attention.2	
And	this	is	why	the	recent	emergence	of	social	media	may	be	worrisome.		
The	rise	of	the	Internet	as	the	new	dominant	means	of	communication	has	tended	to	
produce	a	massive	increase	in	the	average	quantity	of	content	we	process	everyday,	as	well	as	
in	the	speed	at	which	we	process	it.	Many	are	becoming	concerned	that	such	vertiginous	
increases	in	quantity	and	speed	may	be	eroding	our	ability	to	keep	our	attention	focused	on	a	
given	object	for	any	lengthy	amount	of	time.	Moreover,	this	erosion	of	attention	seems	to	be	
taken	further	by	the	rise	of	the	so-called	‘Web	2.0’	(the	tendency	to	transform	the	Internet	into	
a	socially	constructed	medium	by	allowing	for	users	themselves	to	generate	their	own	content,	
through	e.g.	profile	construction,	commenting	and	rating,	liking	or	disliking,	following	or	
unfollowing,	and	so	on),	because	now	also	our	social	identities	are	at	stake	in	each	new	wave	of	
content	delivered	in	the	form	of	a	notification,	a	chat,	a	Facebook	update	or	comment.	Anyone	
with	some	first-hand	online	experience	has	probably	experienced	what	it	is	like	to	not	be	able	
																																																						
2	In	this	short	characterization	I	am	skipping	over	a	number	of	discussions	concerning	the	philosophy	of	agency,	
self-control,	the	will,	and	their	mutual	relationships.	For	discussion,	see	e.g.	Frankfurt	(1971);	Mele	(1992;	2011);	
Heath	and	Anderson	(2010);	Paglieri	(2012).	
to	keep	their	attention	in	one	place	for	much	longer	than	a	few	seconds,	due	to	the	constant	
interruptions	of	the	Web	2.0.	
So,	if	the	internet	and	social	media	are	eroding	our	ability	to	control	our	attention,	and	if	
attentional	control	is	crucial	to	self-control,	we	may	justifiably	worry	about	whether	social	
media	are	undermining	our	ability	to	shape	our	own	lives	by	making	us	less	able	to	focus	on	our	
goals	and	more	likely	to	chase	after	immediate	diversions.		
	
This	is	not	the	first	time	people	have	worried	about	the	negative	effects	a	new	communication	
medium	may	have	on	the	human	mind.	Plato,	for	one,	was	gravely	concerned	about	the	
profoundly	negative	consequences	of	the	great	communication	revolution	of	his	age:	writing.	In	
the	Phaedrus,	he	has	Socrates	tell	the	story	of	a	great	inventor	who	has	just	created	the	written	
word,	who	then	presents	it	as	a	gift	to	the	Egyptian	king.	To	this	the	king	replies:	“this	discovery	
of	yours	will	create	forgetfulness	in	the	learners’	souls,	because	they	will	not	use	their	
memories;	they	will	trust	to	the	external	written	characters	and	not	remember	of	themselves.”3	
By	fixating	words	into	text,	the	truth	of	the	ensouled	speech	will	be	reduced	to	the	mere	
appearance	of	truth	of	the	characters	in	the	inert	page.	And	as	dead	records	pile	up,	living	
memory	will	deteriorate.	
Few	people	alive	today	would	think	that	Plato	was	justified	in	his	criticism	of	writing.	
Even	if—as	it	surely	was	the	case—we	lost	something	irreparably	by	leaving	the	mind	of	the	
oral	tradition	behind,	the	possibilities	opened	by	writing	far	outstrip	any	possible	downsides	it	
may	have.	Most	of	us	would	surely	agree	that	illiteracy	has	proven	to	have	much	more	
paralyzing	consequences	than	literacy.	Yet	Plato	had	no	way	of	foreseeing	the	new	possibilities	
that	would	open	up	with	the	printing	press	and	the	democratization	of	reading	and	writing.		
Something	similar	may	be	occurring	to	us:	the	appearance	of	digital	media	may	be	too	
close	to	our	own	time	for	us	to	truly	envision	the	new	possibilities	it	opens	up.	Still,	Platonism	
has	had	a	recent	resurgence	of	sorts,	inspired	by	the	Internet	and	its	social	turn.	If	Plato’s	
Socrates	was	worried	that	writing	may	deprive	us	of	our	memory	and	make	us	forgetful,	
defenders	of	what	I	call	‘Platonism	2.0’	are	now	worried	that	the	internet	may	be	depriving	us	
																																																						
3	The	story	is	narrated	in	Phaedrus	274C–275B	(tr.	by	B.	Jowett).		
of	our	capacity	for	sustained	attention,	and	making	us	distracted.	Nicholas	Carr	has	recently	
produced	a	forceful	defence	of	this	strand	of	Platonism.4	Against	utopian	views	of	the	Web	2.0,	
Carr	argues	that	the	new	media	are	“changing	our	brains”	in	ways	that	have	unforeseen	
negative	consequences:	they	erode	our	capacity	for	the	paused,	reflective	concentration	
historically	associated	with	the	ascendance	of	the	book,	and	replace	it	with	an	ever-increasing	
disposition	toward	superficial	skimming	and	continuous	skipping	from	one	hyperlink	to	the	
next,	from	one	email	to	the	next	tweet	to	the	new	viral	cat	video.		
Paradoxically,	the	Internet	“seizes	our	attention	only	to	scatter	it”,	says	Carr.	“We	focus	
intensively	on	the	medium	itself,	on	the	flickering	screen,	but	we’re	distracted	by	the	medium’s	
rapid-fire	delivery	of	competing	messages	and	stimuli.”	Support	comes	from	studies	suggesting	
that	whereas	reading	a	book	activates	mainly	zones	in	the	brain	associated	with	memory,	
language,	and	vision,	web	browsing	activates	many	more	brain	areas,	particularly	the	prefrontal	
areas	associated	with	decision-making.	This	may	sound	positive	(the	Internet	makes	us	exercise	
more	brain	regions!),	but	it	is	the	opposite:	surfing	the	Web	implies	constantly	making	decisions	
(about	which	link	to	click	on,	whether	to	like	or	comment	each	post,	and	so	on)	and	
continuously	shifting	between	tasks	(navigating	between	a	myriad	browser	tabs	and	program	
windows,	which	in	turn	house	their	own	distinct	choice	problems);	such	increase	in	choice-
making	and	multitasking	leads	to	a	cognitive	overload,	because,	it	turns	out,	we	are	not	
particularly	good	at	either	of	those	things	(more	on	this	below).	Many	of	the	basic	technologies	
that	make	up	the	Internet	as	the	specific	medium	it	is	impose	decision-making	and	multitasking	
problems.	Take	the	hyperlink:	
	
Whenever	we,	as	readers,	come	upon	a	link,	we	have	to	pause,	for	at	least	a	split	
second,	to	allow	our	prefrontal	cortex	to	evaluate	whether	or	not	we	should	click	
on	it.	The	redirection	of	our	mental	resources,	from	reading	words	to	making	
judgments,	may	be	imperceptible	to	us	[…]	but	it’s	been	shown	to	impede	
comprehension	and	retention,	particularly	when	it’s	repeated	frequently.		
	
																																																						
4	Carr	(2010).		
Thus,	the	Internet	enables	us	to	process	more	things,	but	it	simultaneously	spreads	our	
attention	much	more	thinly	to	cover	a	wider	area	of	content,	and	makes	it	continuously	shift	
between	tasks.	This	in	turn	implies	that	we	end	up	processing	each	bit	of	content	at	much	
shallower	levels	than	we	could	do	before	the	hyperlink,	when	our	minds	were	entirely	focused	
on	only	following	the	linear	content	of	a	book.	This	is	what	Carr	thinks	the	Internet	is	ultimately	
doing	to	us:	turning	us	into	shallower	thinkers,	taking	away	the	capacity	for	deep,	sustained	
concentration	that	the	book	medium	had	enabled	us	to	perform.	
	
Many	feel	that	the	Platonist	2.0	is	making	too	much	of	a	deal	about	the	Internet’s	effects	on	our	
brains.	After	all,	it	is	not	like	deep	concentration	is	our	authentic	way	of	being,	and	that	
distraction	and	impulsiveness	are	essentially	worse	than	it.	If	what	the	Platonist	is	concerned	
about	is	that	we	may	lose	our	authentic	selves,	then	we	would	do	well	to	remember	that	all	our	
modes	of	being—including	the	book’s	lengthy	concentration	mode—are	mediated	by	particular	
cultures	and	traditions,	social	environments	and	communication	technologies,	none	being	more	
natural	or	authentic	than	another.5		
But	we	should	not	underestimate	the	new	Platonist’s	concern.	For,	as	the	marshmallow	
experiment	has	shown,	what	is	at	stake	here	is	our	ability	to	control	the	overall	shape	of	our	
lives.	Attentional	control	undergirds	self-control,	and	self-control	is	necessary	for	successfully	
resisting	temptation	and	following	the	path	we	have	chosen	for	ourselves.	If	the	Web	2.0	is	
making	us	more	distracted,	then	it	may	well	be	depriving	us	of	our	ability	to	control	our	lives,	
and	surrendering	it	to	the	external	forces	that	we	happen	to	come	across.	
But	what	is	the	evidence	for	that	claim?	And	if	it	is	true,	would	it	really	be	a	bad	thing?	
Or	could	it	be	the	opportunity	for	the	emergence	of	new	kinds	of	skills	and	identities	that	go	
beyond	what	the	book	has	allowed?		
I	will	try	to	answer	these	questions	by	exploring	what	we	currently	know	about	the	
effects	of	social	media	on	attention	and	self-control.	The	issue	is	more	complex	than	it	may	
seem,	and	there	is	reason	for	suspending	judgment	about	the	pros	and	cons	of	social	media;	
but	in	the	end,	I	will	land	on	the	side	of	the	Platonist.	Before	that,	however,	we	would	do	well	
																																																						
5	The	response	to	Platonism	from	a	group	of	anthropologists	who	have	recently	studied	the	uses	of	social	media	
around	the	world	(Miller	et	al.	2016,	101–ff.)	goes	along	those	lines.		
to	focus	for	a	while	on	attention	itself.	Until	now	I	have	been	suggesting—as	the	Platonist	
does—that	distraction	is	bad,	and	focus	on	one’s	goals	and	plans	is	good.	But	is	it	always	so?	Or	
indeed,	to	what	extent	should	we	be	focused	and	to	what	extent	should	we	allow	for	
distractions?	
	
The	(virtue	and)	vices	of	attention	
At	its	core,	attention	is	about	attributing	relevance.	In	each	moment	of	conscious	experience,	
out	of	the	myriad	features	of	our	perceptual	and	mental	landscapes,	only	a	handful	of	them	
seem	to	be	so	relevant	as	to	enter	our	awareness.	This	a	way	our	cognitive	systems	help	us	
cope	with	the	world:	by	reducing	the	baffling	richness	and	complexity	of	experience	into	a	few	
chunks	that	limited	minds	like	ours	are	able	to	process.	We	automatically	disregard	most	of	the	
features	of	our	environment	as	irrelevant	(and	then	they	just	fade	into	the	background	of	
experience),	but	some	of	them	acquire	the	special	glow	of	relevance:	they	appear,	more	or	less	
clearly,	in	our	worlds.	
Relevance	can	be	determined	by	us	(endogenously)	or	by	our	environment	
(exogenously).	This	is	why,	roughly	speaking,	we	can	talk	about	two	main	kinds	of	attention:	
attentional	control	is	our	capacity	to	focus	on	the	task	we	are	performing	by	attributing	
relevance	to	the	features	that	are	related	to	said	task,	while	also	ignoring	or	inhibiting	
unrelated	features;	this	is	how	the	endogenous	process	of	attention	works:	when	we	set	a	goal	
for	ourselves,	our	minds	surround	the	task-relevant	features	with	the	glow	of	relevance.	Such	
endogenous	control	of	attention	is	necessary	whenever	we	try	to	perform	a	task	that	is	difficult	
enough	to	require	some	cognitive	processing,	or	sufficiently	extended	in	time	to	require	
sustained	focus—like	the	children	in	the	marshmallow	experiment,	who	need	attentional	
control	in	order	to	avoid	the	temptation	of	eating	the	marshmallow.		
On	the	other	hand,	attentional	capture	occurs	when	some	external	event	grabs	our	
attention,	so	to	speak,	without	our	permission.	If	someone	loudly	pronounces	our	name,	we	
often	cannot	but	notice,	even	when	we	are	deeply	concentrated	on	some	task.	Sudden	loud	
noises	(e.g.	a	baby	crying	on	a	plane	or	a	fire	alarm),	bright	blinking	lights,	and	fast	approaching	
objects	are	good	at	capturing	our	attention,	regardless	of	what	we	are	doing,	or	whether	we	
would	rather	ignore	them.	These	are	exogenous	processes	of	attention:	they	originate	from	
outside	of	us,	and	our	paying	attention	to	them	results	from	an	involuntary,	automatic	reaction.	
These	reactions	make	evolutionary	sense	since	they	are	our	way	of	noticing	unforeseen	
features	of	the	environment	that	may	require	immediate	responses.	
So	the	objects	of	attention	can	be	established	endogenously	or	exogenously;	and	
different	people	have	different	tendencies:	some	people’s	attention	is	more	easily	captured	
than	other’s,	and	some	people	can	more	easily	keep	their	goals	in	mind	and	avoid	diversions	
from	the	original	plan.		
Now,	what	would	be	the	best	distribution	between	endogenous	and	exogenous	
attention?	I	want	to	push	forward	the	idea	that	excesses	in	either	direction	are	problematic,	so	
that	we	can	call	such	excesses	‘vices	of	attention’,	and	that,	in	an	Aristotelian	vein,	the	virtuous	
distribution	of	attention	lies	in	a	middle	point	between	those	extremes.	
	
Vices	of	attention	
Imagine	someone	whose	attentional	contents	are	determined	solely	from	outside:	she	cannot	
maintain	a	unified	attentional	pattern,	but	rather	is	constantly	attracted	by	features	in	her	
perceptual	array	that	invite	her	to	respond	to	them:	she	sees	a	chair,	and	feels	invited	to	sit	on	
it;	she	sees	a	sweater	and	is	invited	her	to	put	it	on.	In	fact,	something	like	this	seems	to	occur	
to	people	with	a	neurological	condition	called	‘utilization	behaviour’,	which	is	roughly	
characterized	as	the	appropriate	usage	of	objects	in	inappropriate	situations.6		Utilization	
behaviour	patients	seem	to	have	lost	sensitivity	to	broad	aspects	of	their	practical	situation,	
and	respond	immediately	to	any	of	the	environment’s	affordances	(i.e.	the	possibilities	for	
action	afforded	by	the	currently	present	objects,	agents,	or	dispositions	of	both).	They	also	
seem	affectively	insensitive	to	the	inappropriateness	of	their	actions.	Thus,	a	patient	with	
utilization	behaviour	may	continuously	switch	a	light	on	and	off;	if	upon	seeing	a	comb	she	may	
start	combing	her	hair	with	it,	regardless	of	who	owns	it;	if	she	is	in	a	bedroom	she	may	undress	
and	go	to	bed,	even	if	she	is	just	visiting	someone	else’s	house;	she	may	drink	from	a	cup	of	
																																																						
6	Pandey	and	Sarma	(2015).	The	condition	was	initially	reported	by	L’Hermitte	(1983),	and	is	linked	with	bilateral	
damage	to	cortical	and	subcortical	locations	in	the	medial	premotor	system.	For	discussion	of	the	syndrome	and	its	
relevance	to	agency	and	control,	see	Baddeley	(2007,	Ch.	17);	Rietveld	(2012).	
coffee	that	is	on	the	desk,	although	it	belongs	to	her	doctor.	And	after	doing	any	of	these	
things,	the	patient	seems	unaffected	by	the	awkwardness	caused	by	her	behaviour.	A	patient	
may	even	give	reasoned	accounts	for	what	she	does:	she	may	acknowledge	the	cup	belongs	to	
the	physician,	and	explain	that	she	drank	from	it	because	she	was	thirsty.	
In	a	sense,	utilization	behaviours	are	correct:	the	patients	use	the	objects	skilfully,	as	
they	should	be	used	(e.g.	they	do	not	drop	the	coffee	cup,	but	appropriately	drink	from	it	and	
then	place	back	on	the	table).	Still,	although	these	behaviours	display	some	kind	of	control,	we	
would	hesitate	call	them	‘actions’—they	are	mere	reactions	to	the	environment’s	affordances,	
exogenously-driven	automatic	responses	that	fail	to	display	the	unity	and	coherence	
characteristic	of	human	actions.	Utilization	behaviour	makes	patients	change	the	focus	of	their	
attention	from	one	aspect	of	the	environment	to	another	without	any	regard	for	their	own	
plans	or	motivations.	In	fact,	arguably,	the	main	feature	of	utilization	behaviour	is	that	patients	
have	lost	their	ability	to	form	and	carry	out	plans	and	motivations	of	their	own.	
If	we	picture	a	spectrum	of	attention,	with	completely	exogenous	attention	at	one	
extreme	and	entirely	endogenous	attention	at	the	other,	an	extreme	form	of	utilization	
behaviour	would	lie	at	the	exogenous	extreme:	an	attention	whose	focus	is	always	determined	
by	capture.	This	is	evidently	problematic,	since	it	makes	it	impossible	for	the	agent	to	perform	
actions	or	follow	through	with	plans	requiring	any	complexity,	and	this	ultimately	leads	to	a	
thorough	inability	to	shape	our	identity.	This	is	thus	an	erroneous	way	to	attribute	relevance,	
and	thus	constitutes	a	vice	of	attention,	a	sort	of	hyper-distraction.	
A	the	other	extreme,	we	find	that	concentration	may	lead	to	a	sort	of	blindness.	In	a	
popular	experiment,	researchers	asked	participants	to	watch	a	video	that	shows	a	basketball	
team	in	action,	and	count	the	number	of	passes	the	team	made.	The	movements	were	fast	and	
hard	to	keep	up	with:	for	many	of	us,	this	would	require	our	undivided	attention.	That	is	why	a	
large	number	of	participants	fail	to	notice	when	someone	dressed	as	a	gorilla	zigzags	between	
the	players,	steps	in	the	centre	of	the	scene,	hits	his	chest	with	his	fists,	and	walks	away.7	The	
‘invisible	gorilla	experiment’	is	the	most	famous	case	of	inattentional	blindness,	the	
phenomenon	in	which	we	are	so	busy	performing	a	cognitively	demanding	task	that	we	become	
																																																						
7	Simons	and	Chabris	(1999).		
effectively	blind	to	things	that	would	otherwise	capture	our	attention.	This	is	the	flipside	of	
attentional	control:	when	we	focus	deeply	on	a	task,	the	rest	of	our	environment	fades	into	the	
background,	even	if	it	includes	gorillas	hitting	their	chests	in	front	of	us.	There	are	more	
mundane	cases	of	this:	when	rushing	to	a	store	trying	just	before	closing	time,	you	may	fail	to	
notice	a	friend	of	yours	waving	at	you	trying	to	say	hello;	you	may	be	looking	straight	in	her	
direction,	but	she	is	effectively	invisible.	Such	is	the	inhibitory	power	of	attentional	control.	
That	is	obviously	a	problem:	we	often	should	pay	attention	to	unexpected	elements	of	
our	context,	even	if	they	are	unrelated	to	our	current	task,	since	failing	to	do	so	may	constitute	
errors	in	our	attribution	of	relevance	that	could	have	have	grave	consequences	(think	about	
failing	to	notice	the	smell	of	gas	in	your	home	because	you	are	so	immersed	in	the	latest	season	
of	House	of	Cards).	Thus,	at	the	other	extreme	of	the	spectrum	lies	the	opposite	vice	of	
attention,	in	the	form	of	a	hypothetical	case	of	a	fully	endogenously	driven	agent,	who	would	
then	be	thoroughly	inattentionally	blind.	This	hypothetical,	inattentionally	blind	character	is	
never	distracted	from	her	tasks,	and	her	attention	is	never	captured	exogenously,	which	would	
entail	dismissing	as	irrelevant	some	features	of	the	situation	that	happen	to	be	relevant.	This	
faulty	attentional	pattern	could	thus	be	called	hyper-concentration.	
Thus	we	have	two	vices	of	attention,	corresponding	to	the	two	extremes	in	the	
attention	spectrum	hyper-distraction	(a	case	of	thorough	utilization	behaviour,	where	
relevance	is	always	exogenously	determined)	and	hyper-concentration	(a	case	of	thorough	
inattentional	blindness,	where	relevance	is	always	endogenously	determined).	Given	that	the	
two	extremes	correspond	to	two	vices,	it	makes	sense	to	think	with	Aristotle	that	in	this	case	
virtue	of	attention	is	somewhere	in	the	middle	between	these	two	extremes.		
Virtuous	attention	is	that	of	an	agent	who	attends	to	what	is	relevant,	in	the	amount	
that	is	relevant,	and	while	it	is	relevant.	Her	subjective	sense	of	relevance	corresponds	to	real	
relevance	in	each	given	occasion;	she	keeps	her	mind	on	her	goals,	and	attends	to	the	things	
that	are	relevant	to	them;	but	whenever	something	outside	of	her	task’s	realm	needs	to	be	
taken	under	account,	her	attention	is	captured	by	it,	which	enables	her	to	find	an	appropriate	
response.	This	is	obviously	an	ideal,	and	I	present	it,	as	well	as	the	aforementioned	idealized	
extremes,	as	tools	for	the	analysis	of	the	effects	of	the	social	digital	media	on	our	habits	of	
attention.	So	let	us	return	now	to	that	question.	In	terms	of	endogenous	versus	exogenous	
relevance,	are	social	media	bringing	us	closer	to,	or	pulling	us	further	away	from,	the	virtuous	
mean	of	attention?	Before	answering	this,	we	should	ask:	how	are	we,	for	the	most	part	
average	Western	human	beings,	located	with	respect	to	it?	
	
Akratic	attention	
A	large	body	of	evidence	suggests	that	our	normal	habits	of	attention	deviate	from	virtuous	
attention	in	quite	a	number	of	ways,	by	systematically	misattributing	relevance.	For	instance,	
we	tend	to	see	losses	as	excessively	more	relevant	than	gains,	and	to	see	immediate	pains	and	
pleasures	as	excessively	more	relevant	than	distant	pains	and	pleasures.8	Moreover,	and	to	the	
present	point,	we	seem	to	be	more	easily	distracted	than	the	virtuous	agent	would	be,	since	
average	human	cognitive	and	executive	capacities	are	severely	limited.	It	is	very	hard	to	keep	
our	attention	focused	on	the	same	task	for	long	spans	of	time,	especially	if	this	requires	filtering	
out	distractors.9	
This	implies	that	we	are	rather	bad	at	multitasking.	More	precisely,	we	rather	suck	at	it.	
Some	people	are	better	at	it	than	others,	granted;	but	we	should	rather	say	that	some	people	
suck	less	at	it	than	others.	The	key	problem	is	that,	as	it	turns	out,	we	cannot	process	multiple	
threads	of	information	in	parallel,	because	our	core	capacity	for	effortful	information	
processing—called	‘working	memory’—works	serially,	i.e.	one	bit	of	information	at	a	time.	
Since	true	multitasking	would	imply	processing	multiple	streams	of	information	through	
multiple	processors,	but	we	have	only	one	working	memory,	we	cannot	truly	engage	in	true	
multitasking.	What	we	can	do,	instead,	is	shift	between	tasks.	Task-shifting	is	generally	less	
effective	than	serially	performing	one	task	and	then	another,	because	each	task	implies	
attributing	relevance	to	different	things,	and	so	things	that	are	relevant	for	one	task	become	
distractors	for	the	other	tasks.	So	multitasking	(or	rather,	task	shifting)	implies	a	loss	of	
efficiency,	because	we	have	to	add	the	costs	of	task	shifting	(of	redistributing	relevance	and	
																																																						
8	These	phenomena	are	called	‘loss	aversion’	and	‘hyperbolic	temporal	discounting’	in	the	literature.	For	the	
former	see	Tversky	and	Kahneman	(1981);	and	for	the	latter,	Ainslie	(2001).	
9	See	Ophir	et	al.	(2009).	
cancelling	the	prior	distribution	of	relevance)	to	the	costs	of	serial	processing.	People	who	say	
that	they	are	good	at	multitasking	may	just	be	bad	at	noticing	how	inefficient	they	become.10	
So	it	is	harder	for	us	to	keep	endogenous	control	of	attention	than	it	is	to	have	it	
exogenously	captured	by	a	diversion,	and	multitasking	increases	the	likelihood	of	distraction.	
This	suggests	that	we	are	closer	to	the	vices	of	hyper-distraction	than	to	those	of	hyper-
concentration.	In	fact,	we	could	say	that	we	tend	to	suffer	from	a	sort	of	‘akratic	attention’:	like	
the	children	who	eat	the	marshmallow	before	the	adult	returns,	even	if	we	wish	to	keep	our	
focus	on	the	larger,	later	reward	(a	consistent	exercise	routine,	a	healthy	work-life	balance,	a	
committed	romantic	life…)	we	often	cannot	help	but	be	distracted	by	the	temptations	of	the	
smaller,	sooner	rewards	in	front	of	us.	So	our	attention	is	akratic	in	the	sense	that	we	tend	to	
lack	the	self-control	we	wish	we	had.	External	diversions	tend	to	capture	more	of	our	attention	
than	they	should,	like	when	we	spend	too	much	time	on	Facebook,	or	end	up	jumping	from	one	
hyperlink	to	another.	We	easily	procrastinate	to	avoid	performing	the	most	difficult,	most	
attention-demanding	tasks.	We	crave	novelty	and	get	all	too	easily	bored,	and	this	often	results	
an	overall	pattern	of	attention	that	lacks	unity,	that	is	spread	toward	many	directions	and	fails	
to	make	unifying	sense.	Of	course,	there	are	people	who	successfully	control	their	attention	
and	achieve	their	long-term	goals	without	too	much	effort;	there	even	are	people	who	go	to	
the	other	extreme	and	obsessively	control	the	minute	aspects	of	their	lives.	But	excess	of	
distraction	is	much	more	common	than	excess	of	rigidity	when	it	comes	to	attention.		
	
(How)	Are	social	media	changing	attention?	
If	self-control	depends	crucially	on	our	proper	distribution	of	attention,	i.e.	on	our	proper	
attribution	of	relevance,	if	the	virtues	and	vices	of	attention	are	as	presented	above,	and	if	we	
tend	to	have	a	rather	akratic	attention	profile,	what	are	the	effects	of	social	media	on	our	
attentional	capacities?	Are	they	changing	the	way	we	shape	our	selves?	And	if	so,	is	this	change	
for	good	or	for	bad?	I	move	on	now	to	summarize	what	the	available	evidence	says	on	this	
issue,	and	speculate	about	the	possible	effects	that	social	media	is	likely	to	have	on	our	
attention	and	self-control	in	the	future.	
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	Two	diverging	attention	profiles	
The	explosion	of	social	media	is	still	very	recent,	and	science	has	a	lot	of	catching	up	to	do.	For	
now,	we	have	only	a	handful	of	studies	that	try	to	establish	the	relationship	between	social	
media,	attention,	and	self-control.	Keeping	in	mind	that	we	are	just	starting	to	delve	into	these	
issues	(and	so	what	follows	is	largely	provisional,	and	should	be	revised	in	light	of	new	
evidence),	this	is	what	we	know	so	far.	
Several	studies	suggest	that	high	levels	of	social	media	engagement	are	associated	with	
lower	academic	performance,	especially	in	heavy	multitaskers.	The	more	people	tend	to	
multitask	between	using	social	media	and	studying,	the	worse	they	do	at	the	latter.11	And	the	
harmful	effects	of	social	media	seem	to	go	further	than	that:	a	recent	study	found	that	people	
were	worse	at	exercising	self-control	after	five	minutes	of	browsing	Facebook	than	after	five	
minutes	of	browsing	CNN.com.	In	comparison	with	the	CNN	group,	those	in	the	Facebook	group	
were	more	likely	to	eat	an	unhealthy	snack	over	a	healthy	one	(thus	showing	they	are	more	
likely	to	succumb	to	temptation),	and	tended	to	persist	less	in	a	difficult	task	(thus	revealing	
they	tend	to	be	distracted	or	give	up	more	easily).	Researchers	conclude	that	“the	effect	of	
social	network	use	on	individuals’	abilities	to	exhibit	self-control	is	concerning,	given	the	
increased	time	people	are	spending	using	social	networks”.12	
Besides	lower	academic	performance	and	lower	self-control,	higher	levels	of	social	
media	use	are	also	related	with	a	lower	ability	to	filter	out	task-irrelevant	stimuli.	In	other	
words,	people	who	report	spending	more	time	using	social	media	like	Facebook	and	Twitter	
have	also	been	found	to	do	worse	at	endogenously	controlling	their	attention.	More	frequent	
social	media	users,	it	seems,	are	more	distracted	people—especially	if	they	use	social	media	in	
multitasking	situations,	a	trend	that	is	increasingly	popular,	and	increasingly	demanded	by	jobs	
that	require	immediate	reaction	to	messages	and	emails.13	
	
																																																						
11	E.g.	Rouis	et	al.	(2011);	Karpinski	et	al.	(2012).	
12	Wilcox	and	Stephen	(2013).	It	is	worth	noting	that	only	those	who	reported	strong	social	ties	with	most	of	their	
Facebook	contacts	presented	lower	levels	of	self-control.	The	effect	was	not	found	in	the	weak-ties	group.	
13	Ophir	et	al.	(2009);	Rouis	et	al.	(2011);	Alloway	and	Alloway	(2011;	2012);	Karpinski	et	al.	(2012);	Wilcox	and	
Stephen	(2013).	
This	all	looks	admittedly	grim.	But	interpretation	of	these	data	demand	caution:	here,	as	
elsewhere,	we	must	be	extremely	vigilant	not	to	confuse	correlation	with	causation.	Given	the	
way	these	studies	were	designed,	all	we	can	infer	from	them	is	correlations,	and	not	causal	
links.14	Thus,	so	far	we	know	that	high	social-media	usage	is	associated	with	lower	levels	of	
attention	and	self-control;	but	from	this	association	we	cannot	infer	that	social	media	are	
causing	an	erosion	of	attention	and	self-control.	This	is	because	several	different	possibilities	
remain	open:	it	may	be	that	something	else	(say,	lack	of	sleep	or	dietary	deficiency)	is	causing	
both	high	social-media	use	and	low	self-control;	or	it	may	also	be	that	it	is	low	self-control	that	
causes	higher	levels	of	engagement	with	social	media.	In	fact,	many	of	the	researchers	suggest	
that	people	who	spend	less	of	their	time	on	Facebook	and	the	others	may	do	so	because	they	
are	better	at	self-regulating	and	more	goal	oriented,	so	that	their	concern	for	their	
performance	in	school	or	at	work	may	be	controlling	their	use	of	social	media	and	their	
multitasking	tendencies	by	making	them	better	able	to	focus	their	attention	endogenously.	We	
also	do	not	know	whether	people	are	currently	more	distracted	or	less	self-controlled	than	
before:	evidence	of	a	different,	harder	to	obtain	kind	would	be	required	for	that.15	
So	is	social	media	causing	us	to	be	more	distracted?	We	simply	do	not	know.	This	should	
give	any	Platonist	pause.	That	said,	what	we	do	know	is	that	people	who	are	more	actively	
engaged	in	social	media	also	tend	to	be	more	easily	distracted.	In	fact—and	to	put	it	in	less	
evaluative	terms—,	what	researchers	have	found	is	that	social	media	use	seems	to	mark	a	
distinction	between	two	divergent	profiles	of	attention,	which	they	call	“breadth-biased”	and	
“focused”	attentional	control.16	I	will	refer	to	this	as	the	distinction	between	a	broader	
attention	and	a	deeper	attention.		
																																																						
14	On	why	obtaining	causal	evidence	in	this	case	is	particularly	difficult,	see	Karpinski	et	al.	(2012,	10).	
15	A	recent	statistic	quickly	became	viral,	stating	that	our	attention	span	had	diminished	in	recent	years.	
Researchers	from	Microsoft	Canada	(2015)	say	that	the	average	human	attention	span	(the	average	time	we	spend	
on	a	single	task	before	getting	distracted)	was	12	seconds	in	2008,	but	went	down	to	8.25	seconds	in	2013.	The	
attention	span	of	a	goldfish	is	9	seconds,	so	now	we	have	become	more	easily	distracted	than	goldfish.	This,	like	
any	scientific-sounding	factoid	found	online,	should	be	taken	with	some	skepticism.	Microsoft	cites	“Statistic	
Brain”	as	its	source	for	the	human-goldfish	attention	span	comparison.	This	turns	out	to	be	a	website,	in	which	the	
data	are	indeed	reported.	But	none	of	their	sources	seem	to	check.	So	the	whole	thing	turns	out	to	be	based	on	a	
made	up	rumour.		
16	See	Ophir	et	al.	(2009)	and	Lin	(2009).	Many	of	the	previously	cited	researchers	make	an	analogous	distinction.	
Such	divergence	may	be	enough	for	Platonism	2.0	to	get	off	the	ground.	If	social	media	
are	linked	to	a	broader	attention	profile—which	is	in	turn	associated	to	higher	levels	of	
multitasking,	lower	levels	of	self-control,	and	higher	rates	of	distraction—,	then	the	use	of	
social	media	is	associated	with	a	shift	away	from	an	akratic	attention	and	toward	a	vicious,	
hyper-distracted	attention.	Even	if	social	media	are	not	causing	this	problem,	they	surely	are	
not	helping	to	solve	it.	Ultimately,	then,	the	evidence	supports	the	view	that	Web	2.0	
multitasking	goes	hand	in	hand	with	lower	levels	of	control	over	the	shape	of	one’s	life,	with	a	
weaker	construction	of	one’s	self;	so	that	if	they	are	not	the	root	cause	of	the	problem,	they	
still	are	far	from	being	a	part	of	the	solution.		
This	Platonist	comeback	makes	sense,	but	it	is	arguably	not	inescapable.	For	as	Plato	
could	not	have	foreseen	the	possibilities	for	self-construction	opened	up	by	the	technologies	of	
the	book,	we	may	be	unable	to	foresee	the	new	paths	of	self-construction	enabled	by	the	new	
digital	media.	
	
New	medium,	new	self?	
I	have	portrayed	self-control	as	the	ability	to	shape	one’s	own	life	by	determining	which	desires	
and	intentions	are	effectively	translated	into	actions,	and	thus	more	globally	as	the	subject’s	
capacity	to	give	a	specific	contour	to	her	own	identity.	Self-control	is	grounded	on	the	capacity	
to	persist	in	one’s	plans	in	the	face	of	obstacles,	and	persevere	in	the	face	of	temptations;	it	is	
sustained	by	the	subject’s	stubborn	will	to	shape	her	own	self.	The	view	of	the	self	as	
something	that	the	individual	generates,	sustains,	and	nurtures	from	within,	by	exerting	
selective	control	over	her	desires	and	intentions,	is	at	the	core	of	the	new	Platonist’s	concern.	
Platonism	2.0	is	the	alarm	of	a	self	that	sees	that	its	means	of	self-forging	are	taken	away	from	
under	its	feet.		
Those	means	were—among	others,	but	crucially—the	technologies	of	the	printed	book,	
and	their	widespread	use.	The	dominance	of	the	book	as	a	medium	meant	that	a	single	person	
could	dig	deeper	than	ever	into	her	own	consciousness,	and	expose	in	meticulous	detail	what	
was	there	to	be	found.	This	is	what	made	modernity’s	novels,	philosophical	treatises,	and	
scientific	monographs	possible.	The	reader	was	also	conceived	of	as	a	reflective	individual,	
capable	of	following	the	sometimes	dense,	often	long,	most	of	the	time	linear	plot	or	line	of	
thought	exposed	in	the	book.	And	thus	writer	and	reader	could	form	a	community	of	reflective	
individuals	capable	of	reasoned	dialogue.	The	case	can	therefore	be	made	that	the	printing	
press	strengthened	and,	to	some	extent,	generated	this	kind	of	linear,	reflective,	thoughtful	
agency,	along	with	its	ideals	of	self-control	and	autonomy.17	
Now,	with	the	drastic	change	of	medium,	a	correspondingly	drastic	change	of	self	may	
well	be	unavoidable.	Electric	mass	media	like	television	and	radio	transformed	the	slower	
speeds	of	the	printed	word,	but	retained	its	linearity	and	unidirectionality.	Digital	social	media	
represent	a	more	thorough	transformation,	because	they	add	to	the	immediacy	of	electricity	
their	hyperlinked	and	interactive	nature.	So	now,	instead	of	the	slow-paced,	monologic,	and	
unidirectional	medium	of	the	book,	and	instead	of	the	unidirectional	and	linear	media	like	
television,	we	have	the	massive,	immediate,	hyperlinked,	and	interactive	media	of	the	Internet.	
How	will	those	radical	changes	in	medium	be	reflected	back	onto	the	formations	of	agency	and	
the	self?	
We	will	have	to	wait	and	see.	One	thing	to	look	out	for	is	whether	the	broader	profile	of	
attention	will	enable	us	to	create	new	kinds	of	abilities.	For	although	we	do	suck	at	
multitasking,	at	the	same	time	multitasking	is	crucial	for	our	ability	to	acquire	new	skills.	To	see	
why,	picture	yourself	trying	to	learn	a	new	musical	instrument.	When	you	first	pick	it	up,	the	
difficulty	of	performing	the	most	basic	tasks	is	enormous:	synchronizing	the	movements	of	
fingers	and	arms	and	legs	with	the	rhythms	of	the	breath	or	the	focus	of	the	gaze	requires	our		
multitasking	capacities	at	their	maximum.	But	with	practice,	these	different	behavioural	
routines	get	automated	and	unified	into	action	‘chunks’,	that	we	are	better	able	to	perform	
with	less	and	less	effort	as	we	continue	to	practice.	This	is	the	effect	of	automation:	we	unify	
multiple	complex	behaviours	into	single	units	of	synchronized,	less-effortful	action	that	we	can	
then	control	intuitively.	Practice	makes	it	easier	to	identify	the	few	really	relevant	bits	of	
information,	and	thus	liberates	attention.	That	is	how	we	learn	how	to	simultaneously	walk	and	
talk,	play	the	guitar	and	sing,	take	a	Snapchat	and	hang	out,	etc.	
																																																						
17	This	is	an	argument	made	by	Carr	(2010),	which	he	himself	traces	back	to	McLuhan	(1964).	
Now,	it	is	possible	that	new,	broader	forms	of	attention	enable	the	emergence	of	
chunked	actions	that	were	impossible	for	traditional,	narrower	attention	profiles.	As	possible	
examples	one	may	think	of	new	kinds	of	musicians	who	now	use	the	computer	to	
simultaneously	compose,	mix,	perform,	and	promote—processes	which	were	until	recently	
quite	distinct,	and	for	which	separate	specialists	were	needed.	This	may	open	up	new,	vast	
creative	spaces	that	were	previously	unthinkable,	new	kinds	of	activities,	skills,	and	trades.	If	
computers	and	smartphones	are	understood	as	general-purpose	extensions	of	working	
memory,	and	the	Internet	as	a	general-purpose	extension	of	our	senses	(both	bodily	and	
social),	then	the	possibility	exists	for	novel	and	unforeseen	forms	of	chunked	actions	that	
externalize	the	cognitive	costs	onto	the	computers	and	the	Web,	while	merging	multiple	
threads	of	diverse	behavioural	routines	into	coherent,	basic	actions	that	we	have	until	now	
been	unable	to	perform.	Along	these	lines,	the	transformative	broadening	of	attention	
generated	by	new	social	media	would	enable	us	(or	rather,	future	generations)	to	engage	in	
multimodal,	collaborative,	multidisciplinary,	geographically	discontinuous	actions	that	are	still	
unimaginable	today,	much	as	the	individualizing,	deepening	actions	made	possible	by	the	book	
and	the	press	were	unimaginable	for	Plato.	
If	this	is	what	novel	actions	will	look	like	in	the	future,	what	may	the	future	self	be	like?	
This	will	have	to	be	a	less	endogenously-determined	self,	based	more	on	its	exogenous	
responsiveness	to	multiple	threads	of	online	stimuli	than	on	its	capacities	for	planning	and	
maintaining	focus,	more	on	new	ways	of	quickly	coordinating	with	others	(on	the	reactions	it	
gets	from	others	in	the	social	media)	than	on	the	old	capacities	for	slowly	constructing	a	long-
term	individuality.	An	emergence	of	this	new	kind	of	self	should	lead	us	to	reassessing	the	
virtues	and	vices	of	attention.	The	new	virtuous	middle,	corresponding	to	the	new	virtuous	self,	
may	move	away	from	the	hyper-concentrated,	and	closer	to	the	hyper-distracted.	Only	that	
now	we	should	probably	not	call	the	attentional	capture	by	features	extraneous	to	one’s	
current	task	‘distraction’,	but	rather	‘responsiveness’,	‘alertness’,	or	‘embeddedness’.	A	broader	
attention	has	the	ability	to	be	more	attuned	to	what	is	relevant	out	there,	beyond	my	own	
individual	plans	and	goals.	The	new,	online	self	would	thus	redefine	how	we	should	understand	
what	is	truly	relevant,	making	it	more	about	being	attuned	to	the	flows	of	information	than	
about	staying	focused	on	my	current	mission.	
	
This	all	sounds	very	neat.	But	it	is	probably	wrong.	For	it	loses	sight	of	one	key	feature	of	skill	
acquisition:	it	is	slow,	it	is	hard,	it	is	effortful,	and	it	requires	persistence.	This	persistence	is	
what	makes	some	people	become	great	guitar	players	while	others	never	learn	more	than	a	
few	chords.	And	at	the	highest	levels,	the	greatest	persistence	is	what	distinguishes	world-class	
performers	from	great	performers.	There	has	recently	been	a	fascinating	debate	about	the	
nature	of	skill	and	expertise,	in	which	anti-intellectualists	(led	by	Hubert	Dreyfus)	defended	that	
as	an	agent	progressed	in	skill	she	needed	less	and	less	executive	control	of	attention,	until	
when	she	finally	reached	the	level	of	expert	she	could	do	without	it	entirely,	merely	following	
intuition	and	feel.	This	has	turned	out	to	be	very	controversial,	and	the	most	recent,	most	
exhaustive	empirical	evidence	seems	to	go	against	it,	and	lean	in	support	of	a	more	
intellectualist	view,	according	to	which	attentional	control	is	required	even	at	the	highest	levels	
of	expert	performance.	As	you	become	more	skilled	and	advance	to	the	higher	levels	of	an	art,	
a	sport,	a	craft,	etc.,	things	also	become	more	difficult,	and	the	possible	diversions	increase	
enormously.	In	order	for	experts	to	perform	at	their	best	they	need	to	stay	focused.	And	this	
implies	great	endogenous	control	of	attention.18	
If	the	intellectualists	are	right,	then	(as	I	argue	elsewhere	that	they	are)19,	then	
Platonism	2.0	still	has	the	upper	hand	regarding	the	effects	of	social	media	on	agency	and	the	
construction	of	the	self.	Acquiring	a	skill	in	more	distracting	environments	requires	even	more	
endogenous	control,	because	agents	need	control	over	their	attention	to	thread	the	multiple	
behavioural	components	into	a	meaningful,	unified	action.	Without	this	great	level	of	
endogenous	attentional	control,	what	is	most	likely	is	that,	in	the	short	run,	agents	end	up	lost	
in	their	multitasking,	having	forgotten	mid-performance	what	it	was	they	were	trying	to	do	in	
the	first	place;	and	that,	in	the	long	run,	agents	will	end	up	unable	to	create	new,	flourishing	
																																																						
18	The	classical	anti-intellectualist	position	was	developed	by	H.	Dreyfus	as	a	reading	of	phenomenologist	Merleau-
Ponty	(see	e.g.	Dreyfus	(2002);	Dreyfus	and	Kelly	(2007)).	Recent	anti-intellectualists	(like	Brownstein	(2014))	have	
had	to	face	a	resurgence	of	a	refined	kind	of	intellectualism	(e.g.	Fridland	(2014);	Montero	(Forthcoming)).	For	in-
depth	discussion.	
19	Bermúdez	(Forthcoming).	
skills	and	virtuous	selves,	rather	generating	incoherent,	haphazard	characters	and	identities.	
Even	multitaskers	need	executive	attentional	control	to	reach	the	heights	of	skill	and	expertise.	
Therefore,	even	new	generations	will	probably	need	self-control	to	generate	new	kinds	of	
selves.		
	
Concluding	remarks:	A	dream	left	unfulfilled	
Here	is	a	final	question:	if	the	emergence	of	a	new	dominant	medium	implies	that	something	
proper	to	the	previous	one	will	necessarily	be	lost,	what	is	it	we	are	likely	to	lose?	And	how	
fundamental	and	crucial	will	that	loss	be?	
Much	like	the	previous	questions,	for	the	most	part	we	will	have	to	wait	and	see.	But	
this	much	seems	certain:	the	Enlightenment	dream,	in	which	each	individual	will	be	able	to	
abandon	his	tutelage	and	think	for	himself,	thus	forming	a	community	of	autonomous	minds	
able	to	engage	in	careful,	reasoned	debate	about	any	issue,	no	matter	how	thorny,	is	likely	to	
become	increasingly	distant	as	we	move	to	the	new	world	of	multitasking,	and	distraction.	For,	
arguably,	the	rise	of	immediate,	massive,	interactive	media	has	coincided	with	the	rise	of	an	
emotivism	and	intuition	in	the	public	sphere	that	tends	to	bury	dispassionate	reflection	and	
reasoned	debate	under	a	mountain	of	gut	feelings	and	intense	reactions,	all	quickly	expressed,	
replicated	and	made	viral	through	Facebook	and	Twitter.	
	This,	again,	is	sufficient	ground	for	a	Platonist	worry,	particularly	considering	that	the	
most	pressing	problems	of	the	contemporary	world—like	climate	change	and	global	economic	
inequality—tend	to	be	very	hard	to	understand,	require	much	deep	reflection,	and	not	be	easily	
communicated	in	140	characters.	Some	kinds	of	content	are	better	suited	for	micro-expression	
via	tweets,	and	for	comprehension	by	short	attention	spans,	and	they,	again,	often	coincide	
with	reactionary,	emotional	messages	that	people	can	understand	intuitively.	So	what	we	may	
ultimately	be	losing,	if	we	lose	the	dream	of	the	Enlightenment	individual,	is	the	very	possibility	
of	a	functional,	reflective	democracy	that	is	capable	of	discussing	a	topic	without	being	
distracted	away	from	the	topic	by	a	tweet-worthy,	rhetorical	sleight-of-hand.	
One	may	think,	then,	that	digital	technology,	being	an	‘extension	of	man’,	may	help	us	
better	understand	these	problems	and	more	effectively	come	up	with	reasoned	consensus	
about	them.20	But	the	problem	is	that	technology,	as	far	as	social	media	are	concerned,	seems	
to	be	pulling	in	the	other	direction,	favouring	attentional	breadth	over	attentional	depth,	brief	
spouts	of	impulse	over	careful	and	dispassionate	reflection.	Instead	of	building	new	scaffolds	
for	our	attentional	control,	new	technology	may	be	removing	the	previously	set-up	scaffolds.	
(This	is,	of	course,	partial.	There	are	new	Internet-based	scaffolds;	it	just	seems	that	the	new	
diversions	are	more	powerful,	but	this	is	a	topic	for	another	essay.)	
So,	will	the	cognitive	extensions	of	technology	lead	us	toward	a	renewed	
Enlightenment?	Or	will	they	push	us	away,	and	into	a	social	formation	that	is	at	the	same	time	
newer	(in	its	massive	synchronicity)	and	more	archaic	(in	its	focus	on	collective	intuition	rather	
than	individual	reflection)?	
For	now,	the	jury	is	still	out.	But	I	would	not	get	my	hopes	up.	
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